

# African Politics and Policy

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This 25th issue of the Newsletter of African Politics and Policy covers a wide range of topics (Agenda 2063, elections in Zimbabwe, African values, international relations). The issue was prepared by APP's editorial team with the contribution of Ornella Ohoukoh and Steven Machaya.

One of the articles of Ornella Ohoukoh discusses what could be done to ensure that African people live longer and healthier lives, while her second article discusses the so called African values and why it is important to take them into consideration.

Steven Machaya's article analyzes the state of the opposition in Zimbabwe and highlights some of the factors that have so far prevented the opposition from defeating President Mugabe and the ruling party.

We also publish two of mine respectively on African news and Togolese People's view of China.

The article devoted to the month in review suggests that bad news (about civil war, conflicts, terrorism, terrorist attacks, drought, famine, disease, ...) have greatly exceeded the good news coming out of Africa this month.

The second article shows that Togolese People have generally a positive view of China's influence on the country's economy, a view which is stronger at the mass than at the elite level.

Riccardo Pelizzo

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## Two weeks in Review

by Riccardo Pelizzo

The week and the month started on April 1 with all kind of bad news from every corner of the continent.

Nigeria experienced a meningitis outbreak and shortage of vaccines, violence escalated in Central African Republic, and inflation was reported to be on the rise because of rising food prices.

April 1 also brought us good news: we were told that Somalia was well on its way to political stability, while Rwanda successfully launched its stock market.

The stabilization seemed to be so promising, so final and so convincing, that the press – on April 3 -could go on to explain why a stable Somalia is so appealing to foreign investors.

April 3 was a happy. Full of good news, Somalia was stable and attractive, a dog saved many people from a suicide attack, and several rhinos were sent to Botswana where they could finally find safety.

On April 3 we also learned that while Africa may not be the happiest place in the world, is probably the most optimistic, and Nigeria received 500,000 vaccines against meningitis.

And precisely when one could finally convince himself that it could be a good week full off good news, bad news started to arrive:

Apr. 3: Zuma fired the finance minister and made one of the most extensive government reshuffles in the history of South Africa ,

Apr. 4: Kofi Annan reminded us that millions of Africans are food insecure and that many people still starve.

Apr. 4: a big earthquake shook Botswana,

Apr. 4. Standard and Poor's downgraded South Africa, in response to Zuma's moves (see Apr.3).

Apr. 5: terrorists attack Mogadishu, showing that Somalia is not that stable after all.

Apr. 5: because of the drought, it became clear the food production will be lower than expected—something that in addition to contributing to the food insecurity of the region, also contributes to rising food prices and inflation,

Apr. 7: in Zimbabwe crops are devastated by army worms, which reduced the country food production, and increased food insecurity,

Apr. 7: Nairobi's 'flying toilets' create the ideal conditions for the outbreak of pandemics.

Apr. 7: rhino's horns can legally be traded (which puts them in a life danger condition) in South Africa, Nigerians are depressed, the University of Rwanda struggles, Mombasa tops the charts of sexual violence cases, and South Africa is downgraded for a second time in a week.

And upon glancing at the news of this, one can only hope that the next may be better and may bring some solutions to the problems we listed here.

The second week of April has brought a bag of mixed news. The second week started, on April 8, with President Salva Kiir announcing that the famine in South Sudan is a national disaster.

The political situation is, if possible, even worse than the famine. The country is crossed by a wave of instability, violence is escalating and South Sudanese people are fleeing.

Analysts feel that South Sudan, the world's youngest country, will not survive as a single political entity but may be split into three smaller, more homogenous and hopefully more peaceful states.

On April 8, South African government officials criticized the international rating agencies for downgrading South Africa and South African citizens launched large scale protests against President Zuma.

April 9 brought more bad news. Liberians are depressed, South Africans are angry with way in which their President is running the country, the quality of African cities is not always very high and terrorists killed many Christians in Egyptian Coptic Churches.

April 10: media announced that Nigeria may be losing its share of the world's oil market and that this event may have a detrimental impact on Nigeria's economy.

April 11: the media reported that army worms attacked Kenyan farms and that the production of various commodities, including maize, could be reduced by up to 40 per cent. Lower agricultural production means less food, higher food prices and lower income for farmers, or, more simply, bad news for Kenya.

April 12: we are reminded that Burkina Faso is still dealing with the threat of terrorism and that more has to be done to keep the country safe and secure, while Cape Town, in South Africa, is running out of water.

April 13: The news of the day highlighted that while African countries are generally low income or low middle income, Africa is nonetheless the home of the largest number of millionaires in the world, that the number of African millionaires is growing faster than African economies, that wealth accumulation is not always the result of individual talent and hard work and that the super rich people in the continent can afford super luxurious lives. And one has the impression that a little wealth distribution could go a long way to reduce poverty in the continent.

Apr. 14: the week end in Somalia. It ends there because in spite of the financial aid from Hong Kong and the US promise that more troops will be deployed to fight terrorists and stabilize the country, Somalia is still plagued by a wide range of problems. As the UN reminded us, Somalia is experiencing a cholera outbreak, which infected 25000, killed 500, and is expected to make many more victims between now and the summer.

This was week 2. A week of pain, of blood, of death, of anger, and despair. And, once again, one can only hope that the next will be a better week. Because if the situation does not improve, one will have to agree with T.S. Eliot that 'April is the cruellest month'

## Agenda 2063: Comment nous assurer que les peuples africains jouissent d'une plus longue et saine espérance de vie ?

By Ornella Ohoukoh

L'Aspiration numéro 1 de l'agenda 2063, des états de l'Union Africaine s'énonce comme suit : une Afrique prospère, fondée sur une croissance inclusive et un développement durable. En ce point, l'agenda énonce les questions de croissance inclusive et de développement durable, deux thématiques essentielles, au centre d'importants débats dans presque toutes les sphères sociales et professionnelles en Afrique et dans le monde. Que ce soit au sein des ménages ou au sein des différents secteurs d'activité tels que la finance, le développement international, la gouvernance, la production, la consommation, l'éducation ou encore la santé, on parle toujours de croissance et de développement. On peut résumer en de simples mots, cet intérêt commun comme suit : les populations veulent se sentir bien et évoluer. Il ne fait alors aucun doute que cette aspiration soit la première c'est-à-dire la plus importante de notre agenda. Cependant il serait judicieux de se poser la question de savoir comment la mener effectivement à bien.

Selon le rapport du classement 2016 du bonheur mondial, il est dit qu'à cause de son intérêt croissant, grand nombre de gouvernements, de communauté et d'organisations, utilisent les données du Bonheur et les résultats des recherches axées sur le bien-être subjectif, pour activer les politiques en faveur de « vie meilleure ». Dans le monde aujourd'hui quatre gouvernements nationaux ont nommé des ministres du bonheur à l'instar des Emirats arabes unis où cette position est dignement pilotée par une femme depuis Février 2016. Dans une de ses déclarations, le premier Ministre des Emirats affirmait que : « Le bonheur n'est pas seulement un vœu pieux dans notre pays. Il y aura des plans, des projets, des programmes et des indicateurs. »

Ainsi donc, le paragraphe précédent essaie de démontrer que la croissance inclusive et le développement durable aboutissent conjointement à la notion de bonheur. De ce fait, pour mieux appréhender les actions à mener dans le cadre de la réalisation de cette toute première aspiration, les états africains devraient certainement se concentrer sur les notions de bonheur, d'espérance de vie, et d'inégalités sociales. Cette démarche impliquera sans doute de nouveaux enjeux tels que l'analyse de l'inadéquation entre la croissance économique et l'augmentation des faibles revenus, l'analyse de la situation actuelle du commerce équitable et des économies sociaux et solidaires en Afrique

ou encore l'analyse de l'impact direct de l'éducation sur la réussite sociale des couches défavorisées en Afrique.

Bien qu'une volonté manifeste des états, ait été mise en lumière, au travers des différents points à l'ordre de cette première aspiration de l'agenda, la nature des plans et des actions à élaborer et mettre en œuvre n'est pas observée. En effet, comme cité plus haut, selon le premier ministre des Emirats Arabes unis, le bonheur, n'est pas seulement un vœu pieu, il y faut des plans, des projets, des programmes et des indicateurs. Plus loin il ajoute que cela fera partie du travail de tous les ministères. La question directe qu'implique cette affirmation serait donc de savoir comment les institutions africaines à l'instar de l'union africaine elle-même, comptent œuvrer pour l'implémentation du nouveau défi du Bonheur Africain. Bien que certains états africains aient mis sur pied des ministères du Futur et que les nations se concertent de plus en plus sur les questions relatives au développement, le taux de migration des africains vers les pays occidentaux connaît une forte croissance et les inégalités se creusent de plus en plus entre les différentes classes sociales. Il serait donc judicieux, que l'Union Africaine rédige une véritable feuille de route de l'Aspiration 1 de son agenda actuel. Cette feuille de route devant porter la casquette d'un Plan de secours, devra formuler les différentes participations des Etats africains à ce processus continental et par ricochet mettre en place les nouvelles barrières à l'entrée en termes de commerce, de distribution de consommation et de production. La mondialisation devra être ré-analysée selon les contextes africains et de nouvelles règles et réformes devront urgemment être mises en place, sans quoi l'Aspiration 1 de l'agenda 2063 n'aura pas plus de valeur qu'une brève introduction au débat Africain.

## Agenda 2063: Quelles sont les valeurs africaines et pourquoi en tenir compte ?

By Ornella Ohoukoh

Aujourd'hui, il est impossible de tenir un débat Afrique-Occident, sans que l'on ne parle d'identité culturelle. L'identité culturelle, cette notion à l'allure controversée et présente au cœur des grandes dissertations post-coloniales, s'affirme remarquablement comme une valeur endogène prioritaire à prendre en compte dans les équations africaines. Cependant, une autre question fondamentale est de savoir ce que représentent aujourd'hui les valeurs et l'identité africaine. A priori, le débat s'articule beaucoup plus autour des traits extérieurs caractéristiques de nos populations, ce qui tend peut-être à erroner la véritable perception que les peuples africains devraient avoir de leurs cultures.

Au cours de ces dernières décennies, l'évolution de la culture africaine a été remarquable. En effet, nombres de pratiques culturelles ont connues des mutations profondes ; nombres de rites initiatiques ont perdu de leur valeurs, la transmission de la connaissance orale s'est considérablement altérée, les valeurs africaines de vie en communauté et de partage, ont laissé place à la culture de l'individualisme accru et cupide, mais l'abandon remarqué des pratiques ancestrales, comporte aussi des aspects pseudo-positifs. Les confrontations tribales et ethniques, laissent place aujourd'hui au sein des jeunes générations à l'ouverture au partage et au métissage, entre autres.

Pourquoi donc le paramètre « culturel » est toujours sous représenté et comment l'agenda 2063 devrait-il en tenir compte ?

Rappelons ces passages de l'agenda 2063, Aspiration 5 points 41 et 42 :

Notre diversité en matière de culture, d'héritage, de langues et de religion doit être une force ;

Les idéaux panafricains, seront intégrés dans tous les programmes scolaires et les biens culturels panafricains (patrimoine, folklore, langue, cinéma, musique théâtre, littérature, festivals, religions et spiritualité) seront promus... Les langues africaines seront le fondement de l'administration et de l'intégration. Les valeurs africaines axées sur la famille, la communauté, le travail, le mérite, le respect mutuel et la cohésion sociale, seront fermement ancrées.

Bien qu'étant optimistes et désireux de croire en la parfaite réalisation de ces deux points de l'agenda, nous y trouvons aussi le début de grands conflits idéologiques dont la résolution nécessiterait plus d'experts et chercheurs que l'histoire du développement n'en a employé jusqu'à ce jour. En effet la complexité de la quantification des données culturelles et le rôle crucial mais ambigu qu'elles jouent dans le développement africain sera le souffre douleur de la réalisation de cette cinquième aspiration. Comment intégrer les idéaux africains dans les programmes scolaires, sans se heurter à ce métissage vertigineux des pratiques occidentales actuelles et des pratiques africaines en mutation ? Comment appliquer les résultats de recherches réalisées sur des peuples ayant

amorcé leur développement depuis deux siècles déjà à des peuples encore loin d'un simple machinisme agricole ?

Il est cependant vrai que certains peuples trouvent déjà le consensus entre modernisme et africanité. C'est peut-être l'exemple du Nigéria dont l'industrie cinématographique a connu une expansion fulgurante, se hissant à la deuxième place mondiale. Pour mobile de succès est cité le multilinguisme de ce pays produisant des films dans les langues locales et en anglais. Cet exemple met donc clairement en exergue la place importante de la langue dans le développement du continent. Dans cet ouvrage de l'UNESCO « Pourquoi et Comment l'Afrique doit investir dans les langues africaines et l'enseignement Multilingue: Note de sensibilisation et d'orientation étayée par les faits et fondée sur la pratique », il est énoncé ces trois observations : la première affirme que le lien entre le développement et l'utilisation des langues est généralement méconnu, la deuxième reconnaît que le lien entre les langues et l'éducation est mal compris hors de cercles d'experts et pour finir, la troisième explique que le lien entre le développement et l'éducation est la plupart du temps acceptée a priori, mais avec une mauvaise compréhension de la nature exacte de la relation. Nous pouvons donc noter trois données majeures que sont, les langues qui jouent un rôle prépondérant dans la transmission des cultures, l'éducation qui vient mettre en œuvre la langue et enfin le développement actionné par l'éducation.

De cette précédente analyse, le facteur linguistique vient donc s'imposer comme étant le trait ou l'élément culturel le plus favorable à prendre en compte en matière de développement du fait qu'il englobe en son sein la majorité des traits culturels propres à un peuple. Il faut donc créer des formations africaines sur mesure avec prise en compte des langues locales africaines le tout posé sur le socle de l'histoire des peuples africains.

Pour ce faire un début de la démarche, devrait consister au recensement des compétences et professions relatives au secteur informel très développé en Afrique et développer des programmes de formation adaptés aux contextes multilingues. Les Universités Africaines avec des modules d'enseignement spécifiques à l'Afrique devraient voir le jour. Les modules enseignés devront être développés sur la base des réalités africaines. La formation primaire et secondaire sera ouverte dans les milieux ruraux en langue locale et nationale avec une obligation de maîtriser les deux langues. En effet oui, à la fin nos diversités seront une force. Les langues étrangères joueront un rôle prépondérant dans cette mutation de l'éducation africaine, et les marges d'erreur au cours de l'implémentation de ces mécanismes devraient être réduites à un strict minimum.

## Zimbabwe's 2018 Elections and the State of the Opposition

By Steven Machaya

There is no doubt that Morgan Tsvangirai and the MDC party represents the official face of the opposition in Zimbabwe and that the fate of this country's democratic transition is closely tied to these two. Zimbabweans have to live with the reality that Morgan Tsvangirai and the MDC have a stake in charting the way forward for Zimbabwe's democratic transition. Notwithstanding Tsvangirai's perceived and real shortcomings as a leader, I argue that Zimbabweans should stop looking for that perfect leader or that perfect party but should rather rally behind a leader and a party that has weathered the storm of state sponsored brutality, a party and a leader that has stayed faithful and true to the 'second liberation' struggle.

Very few if any opposition parties have survived ZANU (PF)'s brutality except the MDC and for that matter, to start investing from scratch in a new political party that could match the MDC's strength is presently impractical and therefore out of question. Joice Mujuru has suffered false starts and already before the 2018 elections, has suffered serious internal challenges leading to a split with the only worth mentioning former ZANU (PF) heavy weights, Gumbo and Mutasa. Her failure to attract heavy weight ZANU (PF) defectors means that her political stature remains dwarfed by the MDC in terms of power, influence and followership. The MDC does not have an equivalent rival when looking at its enduring durability and the level of challenge it has offered ZANU (PF) since its formation in 1999. Even ZAPU under Joshua Nkomo's leadership, cannot compare with the MDC, for the veteran nationalist never beat Mugabe in an election let alone his party commanding a majority in the legislative assembly as did the MDC in 2008.

What Zimbabwe desperately needs is to have someone break its political virginity without necessarily looking for a 'perfect husband to be' but with the desire to have that one time experience of a change of government. History has demonstrated to us that the majority of African countries (such as Zambia and Malawi) that have gone through post independence first time democratic transition (after a long period of single party domination) have never looked back in terms of the people's resolve and ability to remove governments in general elections. Once this break has been achieved, the prospects of power alternation in future elections are mostly guaranteed. An opposition victory has the possibility of psychologically empowering the electorate to make independent choices in future elections in spite of

threats and intimidation. Zimbabweans are not aware of the enormous power they wield in their vote that in spite of intimidation, violence and threats of violence, they can bring about regime change. This is the experience Zimbabweans need thus the need to rally behind a single leader and party. However, having stated thus, it is imperative that the MDC takes note of the following issues in order for people to take it seriously.

Firstly, a lot has been written concerning how ZANU (PF) rigs the elections especially with regards to its manipulation of the voters' roll and the whole electoral process. The challenge the opposition has is that it has so much information at its disposal concerning how the ZANU (PF) rigging apparatus is run but does not sit down to craft ways to at least try and limit the effectiveness of this rigging apparatus. While holding demonstrations and the like has been effective in other countries, in forcing incumbent governments to implement electoral reforms, in Zimbabwe, this approach has proved to be ineffective for a number of reasons, reasons which I will not necessarily dwell on in this short discussion. There are other countries in Africa where the opposition has managed to overcome the challenge of rigging and went on to win elections-by using the concept of sheer numbers. Furthermore, the opposition's rhetoric is defeatist in the sense that they complain so much about the unfair playing field to the extent that they send a message to their followers of the futility of casting ballots in their favor. Many MDC supporters now believe that whether they vote MDC or not, ZANU (PF) will win because that's the message they get from their leaders. Many will remember how ZANU (PF) in 2013, aggressively and ruthlessly sold the idea of a 'resounding victory' in spite of the seemingly serious odds that were against it, especially with the ruling party smarting from an embarrassing performance in 2008. Some political commentators questioned the sanity of such claims by a party that was 'obviously' on its way out. But that's politics. The louder they sang the victory song, the more it became a reality in many Zimbabweans' minds to the extent that even those hostile to ZANU (PF) began to predict its victory. In contrast, the opposition was complaining right into the last day of campaigning and this somehow worked in ZANU (PF)' favor. Because ZANU (PF) benefits from the current

electoral set up, it is not in a hurry to surrender the reins of power by implementing reforms that will guarantee its exit. Why not the MDC aggressively push the victory song, loud enough to give confidence to its supporters and to intimidate the ‘enemy?’

Another serious limitation the opposition has is its inability to rally the support of the local business community, from big players to the small grocery shop owners tucked away in the remote parts of Zimbabwe. The number one reason the local business community will not openly dine with the opposition is that the opposition itself is seriously disorganized and weak and does not pose a serious threat to the present regime. The business community will only be ready to support the opposition only if an atmosphere that points to possible opposition take over is created. The business community does not really care who is in charge as long as it is able to make money. As long as ZANU (PF) somehow continues to allow them to make money, then it does not matter who is in power or whether there are massive human rights violations. Mwai Kibaki of Kenya was able to attract support from local business people after he managed to bring the numerous ethnic groups under a single coalition. The division amongst Kenya’s ethnic groups was a sure guarantee of opposition failure in previous elections. Once this hurdle was overcome, the business community offered its support, guaranteeing the opposition of financial support for its campaign efforts. This is the first step that the MDC needs to take, to court seriously other political parties especially those of electoral significants under a single grand coalition. The challenges to accomplishing this feat are not peculiar to Zimbabwe but other opposition parties have faced the same challenges and it would be ideal to exchange notes and experiences with opposition parties that have successfully done this. Without the support of the local business community, the party will continue to suffer financial challenges which in turn makes it difficult for it to penetrate ZANU (PF) strongholds. This is not an easy feat since the business community is afraid of serious reprisals in the event of a ZANU (PF) victory.

In the next issue I shall proceed to discuss other avenues the opposition needs to explore to find a winning formula in 2018.



## Togolese People’s View of China

In June 2015 we published the results of a small elite survey that one of our associates conducted among Togolese university students. The survey revealed that 40 per cent of the respondents felt that China’s influence was positive, that 40 percent reported that it was neither positive nor negative, and only 20 per cent of the respondents indicated that China’s influence is negative. See: <http://www.africanpoliticsandpolicy.com/?p=294>

The data collected by the Afrobarometer give us a chance to compare the elite views that we reported earlier on with the view held by the population at large. Togolese respondents were asked whether they believed that China’s economic activities affected the Togolese economy. Nearly 87 per cent (86.7 per cent to be precise or 856 out of 987) of respondents stated that China’s economic activities have some or a lot of influence on the Togolese economy. Respondents were also asked whether this influence is positive or negative. Once again 87 per cent of the respondents indicated that China’s influence is either somewhat or very positive (864 out of 992).

Togolese believe that China is a true economic force, that it is a force of good, and that it is good for Togo that China has economic activities in the country. This evidence suggests that the educated classes seem to be somewhat more cautious than the masses in assessing whether and to what extent China’s presence is ultimately a good thing for Togo.

**Riccardo Pelizzo**



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